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"VALUE"-A REPLY TO PROFESSOR KENNEDY
IN a recent article reviewing the common law decisions of
this state as to what constitutes "value" under the doc-
trine of bona fide purchase,' I came to the conclusion that
there seems to be an inverse ratio between the kind and
degree of value required of the innocent purchaser and the
negotiability of the property transferred to him in return
therefor, and in stating that conclusion I said: "It is obvious
that chattels, as such, do not, and need not, possess such a
high degree of negotiability as negotiable instruments, nego-
tiable warehouse receipts and negotiable stock certificates.
Therefore, where the transfer of chattels is effected without
the use of negotiable documents of title, it would seem that
there is not the same commercial necessity for protecting
the innocent purchaser and, hence, the standard of value
required from him should be somewhat higher in order to
entitle him to keep the goods against the defrauded owner."
In commenting on that statement, in a reply article
printed in this Review,2 Professor Kennedy said:
"Professor Whitney seemingly assumes that the
definition of value in the Uniform Acts (other than
the Sales Act) requires the creditor to take a nego-
tiable instrument or negotiable document of title in
order to be classed as a purchaser for value.
"This assumption that the definition of value in
the uniform acts relates only to negotiable documents
of title is apparently incorrect. The UNIFORM BILLS
Or LADING ACT §53, provides that an 'antecedent obli-
gation * constitutes value where a bill is taken
either in satisfaction thereof or as security therefor.'
So, also, the UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT, §58,
provides that an 'antecedent obligation * * * consti-
tutes value where a receipt is taken either in satisfac-
tion thereof, or as security therefor.' Cf. Whitney,
'Whitney, Value and the Doctrine of Bona Fide Purchaser (1933) 7 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 181.
'Kennedy. "Value"--A Plea for Uniformity in New York Commercial
Law (1933) 8 ST. JoHN's L. RV.. 1.
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supra note 3, at 183. It is not necessary, therefore,
for a creditor to receive a negotiable bill of lading or
a negotiable warehouse receipt in order to be a pur-
chaser for value. See also Uniform Warehouse Re-
ceipts Act §58, defining 'receipt' as meaning 'ware-
house receipt' and Uniform Bills of Lading Act, §53,
defining 'bill' as 'bill of lading,' thereby including
within the definitions non-negotiable as well as nego-
tiable bills of lading and warehouse receipts. See also
UNIFORIM BILLS OF LADING ACT §§1, 2, 4; UNIFORM
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT §§1, 2, 4.."
Apparently Professor Kennedy is overlooking the fact
that there are two kinds of innocent purchasers for value:
the innocent purchaser for value who comes within the doc-
trine of bona fide purchase, and the innocent purchaser for
value who does not. A glance at the title of my article
"Value and the Doctrine of Bona Fide Purchase" would
have shown Professor Kennedy that the statements con-
tained in my conclusion were made in reference only to such
an innocent purchaser for value as would come within the
doctrine.
Not every innocent purchaser for value comes within
the protection of the doctrine of bona fide purchase. For
example, it may readily be conceded that "hard cash" is the
highest form of value that a transferee can give for prop-
erty. Let us assume that he innocently purchases chattels
from a thief, who had stolen them, and gives the thief hard
cash for them. He has given the thief the highest form of
value and done so innocently. 'He is an innocent purchaser
for value of the chattels, yet he does not come within the
doctrine of bona fide purchase, because he is not protected
in his possession or ownership of the chattels so purchased
as against the true owner.
By the term "Doctrine of Bona Fide Purchase" is
meant the doctrine that under some circumstances it is equi-
table, or commercially or socially desirable to protect an
innocent purchaser for value. The mere fact that he gave
'Bassett v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 387 (1871); Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y.
133 (1877).
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"value" even. as that term is defined in the Uniform Acts
will not bring him within the charmed circle. For example,
the Negotiable Instruments Law declares that "an antecedent
or pre-existing debt constitutes value, and is deemed such
whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future
time." 4 However, the statute did not contemplate that
every holder who has given such value comes within the
charmed circle of the doctrine of bona fide purchase. If he
gave such value for a non-negotiable instrument,5 or for a
negotiable one with knowledge of defenses against it, 6 or
after its maturity7 he is not protected under the doctrine.
One is not an innocent purchaser for value within the
doctrine of bona fide purchase, even although he gave "value,"
unless there are additional circumstances such as to give him
ORIGINAL RIGHTS rather than mere derivative rights. One
may give the highest form of value, to wit, hard cash, and
still stand only in the shoes of his transferror, i. e., subject
to all equities and defenses; for example, the innocent pur-
chaser of stolen chattels from a thief, 8 or the innocent pur-
chaser of chattels from a bailee 9 or factor 10 who had neither
indicia of ownership nor authority to sell. In all such cases,
no matter what he gave by way of value, he does not come
within the doctrine of bona fide purchase. Likewise, under
the Uniform Acts (the Stock Transfer Act,1 the Bills of
Lading Act,12 and the Warehouse Receipts Act 13) an ante-
cedent or pre-existing debt may constitute value even if
given for a non-negotiable stock certificate, bill of lading or
warehouse receipt, but the draftsmen of those Uniform Acts
never intended that a transferee who gave such value for a
non-negotiable document should acquire original rights, i. e.,
'NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (1909) §51.
"Allen v. Henry, 16 App. Div. 557, 44 N. Y. Supp. 956 (4th Dept. 1897).6 Crandall v. Vickory, 45 Barb. 156 (N. Y. 1865); Hall v. Wilson, 16
Barb. 548, 553 (N. Y. 1853).
'Bacon v. Burnham, 37 N. Y. 614 (1868); In re Clover, 154 N. Y. 443,
48 N. E. 892 (1897).
'Supra note 3.
*Smith v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 190, 21 N. E. 160 (1889); Green v. Wachs,
254 N. Y. 437, 173 N. E. 575 (1930).
" Freudenhim v. Gutter, 201 N. Y. 94, 94 N. E. 640 (1911) and cases
cited therein.
' UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER AcT §22.
' UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING AcT §53.
'UNIFORM WAREHOUSE REcEIPTs ACT §58.
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come, within the charmed circle of the doctrine of bona fide
purchase.14  He is merely an assignee of a non-negotiable
chose-in-action and does not come within the doctrine of
bona fide purchase, although he gave the value defined in
the Uniform Acts. Thus Professor Kennedy's comment that
"Professor Whitney seemingly assumes that the definition of
value in the uniform acts (other than the Sales Act) requires
the creditor to take a negotiable instrument or a negotiable
document of title in order to be classed as a purchaser for
value" is misleading since it is obvious that my inten-
tion was that the creditor must take a negotiable docu-
ment of title rather than a non-negotiable one in order
to be such an innocent purchaser for 'value as to come within
the protection of the doctrine. Of course one may innocently
give value for a non-negotiable document and still not come
within the charmed circle. The point I was making is that
one is not such an innocent purchaser for value as to come
within the doctrine unless he receives a negotiable bill of
lading or a negotiable warehouse receipt.
Strangely enough, Professor Kennedy seems to have had
in mind such an innocent purchaser for value as acquired
original rights but he appears to be laboring under the im-
pression that all that is necessary to bring the creditor within
the charmed circle is that he have given value innocently
and in good faith, for he writes: "Innocence and good faith,
linked with this ingredient of value, combine to place the
litigant in a favored position before the courts." And again:
"The main objective will be to determine whether the credi-
tor so receiving personal property from his debtor (by way
of payment of or security for past debts) comes or should
come within the charmed circle of purchasers for value."
And still further on in stating the problem he says: "Is he
to be classed as a bona fide purchaser and therefore divorced
from latent equities which attach to the property while it
remains in the hands of the debtor?" Surely Professor Ken-
nedy does not contend that a creditor who receives a non-
negotiable bill of lading or warehouse receipt in return for
giving up an old debt will come within the charmed circle.
"'UNIFORM SALES ACT §31.
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Even if we were to adopt the uniform definition of value
urged by Professor Kennedy, he would still be what he is
today, a mere assignee of a non-negotiable chose-in-action
and nothing more. The adoption of the uniform standard
of value will not bring all creditors within the doctrine of
bona fide purchase as Professor Kennedy seemingly assumes.
It is therefore submitted that the conclusion reached in my
article that where the property transferred is a document of
title, as a general rule, only one who has received a negotiable
document can be such an innocent purchaser for value as to
come within the protection of the doctrine, seems to be the
correct one.
FREDERICK A. W HITNEY.
St. John's University School of Law,
April 9, 1934.
